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Two Sides of COIN

COIN Doctrine Is Wrong
M. Chris Mason
ABSTRACT: Counterinsurgency does not increase the legitimacy
of, or support for, central governments engaged in internal conflicts.
Recent research shows quantifiable degrees of government
legitimacy, national identity, and population security are necessary
precursors and accurate predictors of a government’s ability to
outlast a civil uprising. Because the first two predictors—government
legitimacy and national identity—can be measured and do not
increase during a conflict, the probability of government failure in
most cases can be accurately predicted when the conflict starts.

A

lthough fighting against internal rebellions is as old as conflict
itself, the term “counterinsurgency” (COIN) to describe such
conflict originated only recently, first appearing in the English
language in 1962. The Kennedy administration introduced the word as
part of a new doctrine of limited war intended to contain communist
expansion.1 The basic premise of COIN holds that civil actions can be
taken to increase support for a central government and thereby decrease
support for an internal rebellion. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
counterinsurgency in straightforward terms: “military or political action
taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.”2 The US
Department of State expands upon this, defining counterinsurgency as
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat
and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”3 According to the U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide, a counterinsurgency campaign should
integrate and synchronize political, security, economic, and informational
components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing
insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should be designed
to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen
the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and
marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically.4

As journalist and contemporary historian Fred Kaplan phrases it,
“the premise of counterinsurgency is that insurgents arise out of sociopolitical conditions and, therefore, the point of a counterinsurgency
campaign, or the goal of it, is not just to kill and capture insurgents, but
to change the living conditions to help the government provide basic
1. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “counterinsurgency (n.),” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/counterinsurgency.
2. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “counterinsurgency (n.),” https://www.oed.com/. Italics added.
3. US Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PMA), U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: PMA, 2009), 12, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents
/organization/119629.pdf. Italics added.
4. DoS, Counterinsurgency Guide, 12. Italics added.
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services to the people, so that support for the insurgency dries up.”5 As
recently as 2013, RAND Corporation published a study entitled Paths to
Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies in which the authors purported to
lay out the best practices to “help host-nation governments reform . . .
and increase their legitimacy.”6 In short, the basic principle underlying
counterinsurgency doctrine is that civil actions can be taken to increase
support for an embattled government and increase its legitimacy.
This premise seems logical and obvious: If a government makes its
people safer and improves their lives, their support for the government
will increase. Although rational, this assumption is untested, and as
Columbia University professor Rita McGrath notes, the danger in
suppositions of this type is to “take the untested assumptions that
underlie the . . . plan and treat them as facts.” 7
In this case, the untested assumption upon which COIN doctrine
rests—that actions can be taken to increase support for a government
during an internal conflict—is wrong. A study conducted at the US
Army War College from 2015 to 2020 found no empirical evidence that
counterinsurgency means and methods increased either popular support
for a government or the public perception of its legitimacy in any
internal conflict since the end of World War II. Governments have been
successful in defeating rebellions, and governments that used many of
the methods and actions prescribed by counterinsurgency doctrine have
successfully suppressed internal conflicts. But these victories have led to
the erroneous claim that success is a result of “doing counterinsurgency
right.”8 This is a classic example of the logic fallacy known to the ancient
Romans as post hoc ergo propter hoc: “after this, therefore because of this.”9
But sequence is not causation.

Quelling Internal Rebellions

In the vast academic literature of internal conflict, the recognition
that counterinsurgency doctrine is wrong is not new. For example,
Gian Gentile observed anecdotally that counterinsurgency did not
work in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Without fully recognizing
the reasons why this was the case, he nonetheless argued vociferously
against COIN doctrine.10 The research study behind this article
5. A. C. Valdez, “A Decade at War: Afghanistan, Iraq and Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad
Media, podcast, aired March and September 2013, https://www.americaabroadmedia.org/radio
/decade-war-afghanistan-iraq-and-counterinsurgency.
6. Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2013), xxxv, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html.
7. Rita Gunther McGrath, “The Dangers of Untested Assumptions,” MIT Sloan Management
Review, October 26, 2009, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-dangers-of-unchecked-assumptions/.
8. For example, see Michael O’Hanlon, interview by Fareed Zakaria on Global Public Square,
“What Will Obama’s Afghanistan Policy Be?” transcript, January 25, 2009, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0901/25/fzgps.01.html; and Michael Crowley, “Obama versus Osama,”
CBS News, December 8, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-versus-osama/.
9. John Woods and Douglas Walton, “Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc,” Review of Metaphysics 30,
no. 4 (June 1977), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126985.
10. Colonel Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York:
New Press, 2013).
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identifies and enumerates the political science underlying the failure of
counterinsurgency and, using quantifiable metrics, concludes precisely
why governments succeed or fail against internal rebellions.
For the past five years, the Study of Internal Conflict at the Strategic
Studies Institute of the US Army War College has systematically
researched and analyzed the 53 internal conflicts since 1945 in which
an internal rebellion sought either control of the government or the
creation of an independent breakaway country, and in which at least
1,000 persons died in a 12-month period. The study used the Oxford
University Armed Conflict and Correlates of War Project databases to
identify all relevant internal conflicts.11 Because there are many kinds of
civil conflict (for example, wars between ethnic groups in remote areas
that are not fought for control of the government), internal conflicts in
the Correlates of War database to which the government was not a party
were excluded from the study.
The study sought to identify all political-military factors that
correlate with government defeat in at least 90 percent of all cases. Some
factors were interrelated, as will be seen, and were often nested together.
As in calculating probable medical outcomes across multiple morbidity
factors, the presence of multiple negative political-military factors in one
conflict decreased the likelihood of government survival to close to nil.
The study results show conclusively that governments fail against
internal rebellions for five fundamental structural reasons, and the
outcomes of internal conflicts are heavily dependent on these five
preexisting political-military conditions. Each of the five factors was
found in government failure in at least 94 percent of all 53 conflicts, and
only two of the five are susceptible to military action. Further, two of the
five factors are simple binary variables, while the remaining three factors
are mathematically quantifiable to a useful degree of accuracy, creating
thresholds that correlate to government defeat with a remarkable degree
of consistency and accuracy.
Furthermore, the empirical data prove only two of the five factors
can be altered in any meaningful way after the onset of hostilities. In
essence, whether a government may be successful in suppressing an
internal rebellion depends predominantly on whether these five factors
are present at the start of the conflict. Thus, collectively, they constitute
a predictive model of probable outcomes with a reliability that startled
researchers. Cases of successful counterinsurgency often cited by
proponents of COIN doctrine were found to be simply cases where
all five political-military factors were already in favor of the existing
government at the outset of the conflict.
The research shows the basic assumption behind “clear, hold,
and build” (in Afghanistan), “pacification” (in Vietnam), or “nation
building” (in Iraq), indeed behind all counterinsurgency, is wrong. No
11. The Correlates of War Project, data sets, https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets;
and Oxford University Armed Conflict Database, https://libguides.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/c
.php?g=422808&p=2887072.
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evidence supports the contention that these lines of effort increased
government legitimacy—one of the five factors—and a number of
studies found such efforts did not. For example, an independent
before-and-after study conducted during the war in Afghanistan
showed a mathematically 0 percent increase in either support for the
local government or the government in Kabul after the completion of
hundreds of civil affairs projects.12 A similar study produced the same
results during the Iraq War.13 In his study of the massive US Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) effort
in Vietnam, British historian Andrew Gawthorpe also concluded the
effort to increase support for and the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese
government did not work.
Nation building had failed. . . . CORDS failed despite its attempt in the latter
years of the war to emulate the successes of the Vietnamese Communist
movement through the village system. Through the village system . . . .
CORDS had abandoned the attempt to build rural support on the basis
of an imagined community of the South Vietnamese nation, and instead
had shifted to the idea of communalism which the communists had used
so successfully. . . . But it was precisely the political contents of CORD’s
programs, and its attempts to forge a network of pro-GVN village
communities that failed. The GVN never managed to become . . . legitimate
enough to demand the sacrifices needed to win the struggle against the
Communist movement. As outsiders both in understanding and in influence,
American nation builders could hardly do so either. . . . Nation building
was an unavoidable condition of victory. . . . It was also almost certainly
preordained to be impossible.14

In many cases, as a result of poorly understood local village
economies, aid projects were found to have increased local conflict.15 A
study focused on the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive
and Integrated Delivery of Social Services program in the Philippines,
for example, found the “program exacerbated violent conflict in
eligible municipalities.”16

Civil War or Insurgency?

Before proceeding further, a note on etymology is needed to
explain why the study used the terminology “internal conflict,” or
“internal rebellion,” instead of insurgency or civil war. Conflict naming
conventions are fraught with political considerations and are often driven
12. Jennifer Brick, The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan
(report prepared for the annual meeting of the Central Eurasian Studies Society, Washington, DC,
September 2008), https://www.bu.edu/aias/brick.pdf.
13. Barnett Koven, “Development Assistance and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence” (PhD
diss., George Washington University, May 21, 2017).
14. Andrew J. Gawthorpe, To Build as Well as Destroy: American Nation Building in South Vietnam
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 185–90.
15. Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review
104, no. 6 (June 2014): 1630–66, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.6.1630.
16. Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, “Aid under Fire: Development
Projects and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review 104, no. 6 (June 2014): 1833–56, https://www
.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.6.1833.
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by participant perspectives and politics.17 The dictionary definitions of
civil war and insurgency are basically the same: two groups of citizens
of the same country fighting each other for political power.18 There is
nothing in the dictionary definition of either term regarding the size of
the conflict, its duration, or other characteristics. The difference in the
applications of these terms is thus primarily political.
Governments fighting against internal rebellions generally avoid
using the term “civil war” since it reflects badly on the government
and possibly legitimizes the opposition. Instead, these governments
prefer terms like “rebellion” and “insurgency,” and they may even use
words intended to delegitimize the rebelling group as a whole, such as
“bandits” and “malcontents.”19 Following this pattern, when foreign
powers intervene in internal conflicts on the side of governments, they
too, usually use the term “insurgency” to refer to the fighting. Thus,
when the United States intervened in Vietnam and Afghanistan in
support of those governments, the conflicts were consistently referred
to as insurgencies and rarely, if ever, as civil wars.
In contrast, in cases where the United States opposes the
government in power, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria, the fighting
is typically referred to in official statements and policy documents as a
civil war. Conversely Russia, which has intervened heavily on behalf
of the al-Assad government of Syria, refers to the conflict there as an
insurgency and never uses the term civil war.20
A hermeneutical reading of US government-produced documents
that define insurgency, such as Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Operations, the aforementioned US Government Counterinsurgency Guide,
and the CIA’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, shows the definitions
inherently privilege the existing governments with terms like
“constituted government” and “established government” and identify
rebel political activities as “illegal,” so the use of the term “insurgency”
effectively means the speaker has taken the side of the government.21 Of
note, the United Nations tellingly avoids both terms, preferring neutral
language such as conflict and violence. The characterization of an
internal conflict as an insurgency or a civil war is usually driven by which
side of the conflict the speaker is on; hence the term is best avoided.22
17. Edward Wong, “A Matter of Definition: What Makes a Civil War, and Who Declares
It So?” New York Times, November 26, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/world
/middleeast/26war.html.
18. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “civil war (n.),” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/civil%20war; and Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “insurgency (n.),” https://dictionary.cambridge.org
/us/dictionary/english/insurgency.
19. Michael V. Bhatia, “Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent
Actors,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 5–22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993760?
refreqid=excelsior%3A259cbe2857da1aae6100f9a2d5d06073&seq=1.
20. Madeline Conway, “Timeline: U.S. Approach to the Syrian Civil War,” Politico, April 7, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/timeline-united-states-response-syria-civil-war-237011;
and Wong, “A Matter of Definition.”
21. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, rev. ed.
(Washington, DC: CIA, 2012), 28–29.
22. Wong, “A Matter of Definition.”
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Five Determinant Factors of Internal Conflict

In addition to the criteria of legitimacy of governance identified
above, the other determinant factors identified or confirmed by the
study as corresponding to government defeat in at least 94 percent of all
53 conflicts are: national identity (the percentage of the population that
locates its personal identity at the level of the nation), the percentage
of the population adequately safeguarded by internal security services,
and two binary variables already broadly known in the literature of
internal conflict—external sanctuary for rebels and the preexistence of
sustainable security forces. The latter two criteria require little additional
amplification except to note the study research bears out these two
recognized factors without exceptions.
The study was able to quantify the levels of national identity and
population control necessary for a government to prevail as 85 percent—
the same as for government legitimacy. The parameter of national
identity, in the accepted political science sense, was defined as at least
85 percent of the population locating their personal identities at the level
of the nation.23 In cases where less than 85 percent of the population
claimed a unified national identity, 96 percent of governments facing
internal rebellion as defined above suffered defeat. The national identity
factor usually coincided or nested with that of legitimacy of governance,
especially in cases where the majority ethnic, linguistic, or religious
national group comprised more than 85 percent of the population and
also predominated in the country’s government.
The factor of population security was defined as the government
securing and isolating at least 85 percent of the people from meaningful
contact with or violence from guerilla elements. It is usually impossible
to prevent a single guerilla or a small group of guerillas, either openly
or in disguise, from infiltrating a populated area and from avoiding
detection by security forces for a brief period—for example, to prevent
every suicide bomber from getting through security measures. Security
is rarely airtight, but successful governments create firewalls between at
least 85 percent of the civilian population and guerillas; such barriers
prevent meaningful political contact, such as proselytizing, leafleting,
and public addresses, as well as virtually all targeted violence against
government leaders and supporters.
Governments that failed to secure 85 percent of their populations
lost in 94 percent of the 53 case studies. The 85 percent threshold
recurred throughout the research and was almost a magic number in
government survival. The criticality of population security to defeating
internal rebellions is well established. Mao Zedong, for example,
recognized the threshold in 1937 in his treatise, On Guerrilla Warfare:
“Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying
a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase
and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of
23. Omar Dahbour, “National Identity: An Argument for the Strict Definition,” Public Affairs
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (January 2002): 17–37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40441311?seq=1.
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the population. The size of this ‘significant segment’ will vary; a decisive
figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.”24 The data derived from the Study
of Internal Conflict more precisely pinpoint this number at a minimum
of 15 percent.
The first of the two binary variables, the existence of militarily
significant external sanctuary available to rebel forces, was defined for the
study as the persistent ability of insurgents to cross a neighboring border
in numbers that would impact the outcome of a conflict and to obtain
sanctuary there from government forces. Defining militarily significant
numbers seemed at first to be problematic for the study designers. In
actuality, however, the existence or lack of external sanctuary was clearcut in virtually all of the 53 conflicts—there were few marginal calls to
be made in assessing whether rebels had cross-border sanctuary. Rebel
movements on islands, for example, could not have external sanctuary
in any significant numbers. Conversely, most international borders are
very difficult to secure completely, even for developed countries with
almost unlimited resources (for example, the US borders with Canada
and Mexico).
In all 53 conflicts, governments were unable to defeat rebel
movements that maintained external sanctuaries. The sole ambiguous
case in this regard was the second stage of the Greek Civil War from
1946 to 1949, in which the leftist National Popular Liberation Army,
or Ethnikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Strátos (ELAS), initially had sanctuary
and external support from bordering Albania and Yugoslavia, and to a
lesser extent, from Bulgaria. But the UN General Assembly began to
criticize severely the three communist countries for their role in the
war, and in 1949 Yugoslavia broke with Russia and closed its frontier
with Greece. The loss of sanctuary in Yugoslavia was a severe blow to
ELAS as was greatly diminished help from and refuge in Bulgaria and
Albania—Stalin backpedaled from his proxy support through Bulgaria
while the United States surged aid to the Greek government. While
ELAS made many tactical blunders, this early case study in the postwar
record remains an asterisk in the factor of external sanctuaries.25
The second binary variable factor was defined for the study as
the preexistence of sustainable, reasonably competent government
security forces at the onset of internal violence. The study found no
government since 1945 facing an armed rebel movement that did not
have existing security forces survived the conflict. In other words, the
lack of an established army at the beginning of an internal conflict was
fatal for the government in every case. But because virtually all countries
24. US Marine Corps (USMC), Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Fleet Marine Force Reference
Publication 12-18, transl. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, April 5,
1989), 27, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20
Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf. Italics added.
25. See “Greek Civil War,” HistoryNet, website, https://www.historynet.com/greek-civil-war
.htm; Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special
Committee on the Balkans, 1947–1952 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990); and Andre Gerolymatos, Red
Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of the Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943–1949
(New York: Basic Books, 2004).
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since 1945 have had standing armies under the control of their central
governments, this factor did not often come into play and therefore had
a relatively minor impact on the research findings. Nonetheless, there
are significant exceptions, including the US phase of the Afghan conflict
from 2001–21 and the anti-government rebellion in Iraq after 2003.
Table 1. Conflict parameters
Metric

Fail Rate

National Identity

Factor

<85%

96%

Government Legitimacy

<85%

94%

Population Security

<85%

94%

Existing Security Forces

No

100%

External Sanctuary

Yes

100%

South Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and Malaya

Brief executive summaries of case studies where counterinsurgency
doctrine was applied are useful for illustrating how these five basic parameters
are situated within and applied to historical conflicts. The counterinsurgency
efforts in Vietnam and Afghanistan stand out among America’s wars for the
tragedy and futility surrounding them. Considerable time has been spent
identifying lessons learned from both wars, and these lessons learned were
the genesis of the Study of Internal Conflict Research Program in 2015.
At a fundamental strategic level, the two conflicts are structurally similar.
In both cases, the United States effectively created and supported a government
in a country that was not a nation in the political science usage of the word.
In both cases, the United States attempted to create a democracy as the basis
for the government’s legitimacy where no previous tradition of democracy
existed.26 In both wars, anti-government forces received existential support
from a nuclear-armed neighbor and had cross-border external sanctuaries
in two neighboring countries (Laos and Cambodia in the Vietnam War,
Pakistan and Iran in the Afghanistan War), which the United States and the
central governments of South Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively could
do little to disrupt.
In both conflicts the central governments, which were largely created and
supported by the United States (with some degree of additional international
support), were not broadly seen as legitimate by a majority of the population
(again in the political science usage of the term).27 Moreover, opponents of
the regimes in both cases were able to mobilize narratives that established
a greater claim to legitimacy from other sources, in the Weberian sense.28
In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States built a comprehensive,
26. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
27. See Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, s.v. “legitimacy,” Princeton University, https://
pesd.princeton.edu/node/516.
28. Max Weber, “IV. Politics as a Vocation: ‘Politik als Beruf,’ Gesammelte Politische Schriften,”
in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/stille
/Politics%20Fall%202007/Readings%20--%20Weeks%201-5/Weber%20-%20Politics%20as%20
a%20Vocation.htm.
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top-down model of governance (central government to provincial government
to district government), while the opponents of the regimes worked from
the bottom up to control the village populations in the rural areas, where
approximately 80 percent of the people of both countries lived.
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, US war planners made a conscious
choice to rely primarily on police or local paramilitary forces to protect villagers
against guerilla infiltration and violence—forces that were demonstrably
unequal to those tasks in both conflicts—while conventional military forces
were used to conduct large “cordon and sweep operations” intended to
drive guerilla forces from an area and confiscate or destroy weapons and
materiel useful to the enemy.29 Leaders of local governing bodies, established
at the district levels in South Vietnam and Afghanistan, were often chosen
by the central governments in Saigon and Kabul on the basis of graft
pyramid schemes or palace politics and were frequently unacceptable to local
populations as a result—a counterproductive effort that made the rebel’s
local political work easier.30
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, there was a trifurcation of lines
of effort. As the main conventional Army defaulted to conventional
operations, the smaller civil affairs components conducted pacification and
reconstruction programs, which were often at odds with frequently corrupt
central government planning efforts. At the same time, special operators
increasingly sought to eliminate high-value targets with CIA oversight
through the Phoenix Program in Vietnam and similar high-value-target
operations in Afghanistan. In both conflicts, these targeted kill-or-capture
missions were not coordinated with the conventional forces and were often
conducted on the basis of flawed intelligence, sometimes neutralizing the
intended target, but often arriving too late or arresting or killing the wrong
man. These operations upset villagers, upending the patient work of the civil
affairs components, and played into enemy propaganda.
Tragically in both conflicts, the overuse and sometimes indiscriminate
application of the US advantages in fire support resulted in extensive civilian
casualties. An estimated 220,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed by
forces fighting for the South Vietnamese government from 1962 to 1975,
and at least 135,000 civilians have been killed and wounded in Afghanistan
since 2001, where claims about responsibility often conflict.31 Such civilian
casualties alienated the rural population not just from the United States
but from the central government it was known to be supporting.
29. See for example, David Pearson, “Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland,” in
Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, ed. Michael C. Desch (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2001), 106.
30. Gawthorpe, “To Build as Well as Destroy.”
31. Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, “Vietnamese Casualties during the
American War: A New Estimate,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 4 (December 1995): 783–
812, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2137774?seq=1; Neta C. Crawford, Update on the Human Costs
of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016 (Boston: Watson Institute, Brown University,
August 2016); “Afghanistan: Civilian Casualties Exceed 10,000 for Sixth Straight Year,” UN News,
February 22, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057921; and UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020
(Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, February 2021), 11, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default
/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf.
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There are many other operational parallels between the wars,
such as the marginalizing of the advisory mission until far too late in
the conflicts, infantry tactics that instilled systemic overreliance on
US-provided air support among the South Vietnamese and Afghan
armies, and the inability to develop a functional language capability
to obviate the persistent failure of communications via interpreters.
In another parallel, the United States and the host governments,
while attempting to build stable armies in Vietnam (the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam) and Afghanistan (the Afghan National Army),
were largely unable to overcome debilitating problems with desertions
(attrition rates in Afghanistan never dropped below 30 percent per
year), enemy infiltration of the ranks (resulting in widespread lack of
information security), pervasive drug use, and getting recruits into the
training pipeline.32

South Vietnam
While the basic building blocks of a separate South Vietnamese
national identity—a common ethnicity, culture, and language shared
by more than 85 percent of the population—arguably existed in the
mid-1950s, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem squandered the social
capital, which did exist for creating a South Vietnamese nation, by
exacerbating the religious fault line between the Catholic minority
government and the country’s Buddhist majority, effectively creating a
body of resistance to the government that remained a key factor in South
Vietnamese politics throughout its brief existence.33 Diem also alienated
the nonethnic-Vietnamese peoples living in the south, such as the Nung,
Hmong, Chan, and Hoa, further eroding his legitimacy. Rather than
trying to build consensus and a broad nationalist movement, Diem
chose to focus on repressing his political rivals in the south and waging
war against competing anticommunist sects such as the Cao Dai and the
Hoa Hao at the expense of national cohesion.34
Thus, none of the governments of South Vietnam had 85 percent
legitimacy, and South Vietnam could not be considered a nation (less
than 85 percent of the population self-identified specifically as South
Vietnamese as opposed to simply Vietnamese). While the communist
movement in the South, which became known colloquially as the Viet
Cong, was initially weak, by 1958 the South Vietnamese government
could no longer claim full population security of and control over
85 percent of the population of the south.
Moreover, this figure continued to erode throughout the course of
the conflict until by 1972, the Viet Cong controlled or influenced the
majority of the rural population of the country south of the demilitarized
32. M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the
Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan (Carlisle,
PA: US Army War College Press, 2015), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2340.pdf.
33. Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern
Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
34. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance.
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zone. Enemy forces could and did make massive use of external
sanctuaries and supply corridors in bordering Laos and Cambodia,
which the United States and South Vietnam were not able to interdict
effectively. Of the five factors defined by the study, only the preexistence
of a sustainable and reasonably competent army applied. South Vietnam
did possess the basic elements of a capable military force with some very
good fighting elements, particularly its ranger and paratrooper battalions.
But these capabilities were largely crippled by central government
corruption and political appointments to military leadership positions
that prioritized loyalty to Saigon over military competence.
Table 2. Conflict parameters: South Vietnam
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

Yes

Afghanistan
Not only is Afghanistan not a nation (less than 85 percent of the
population places their personal identities at the level of an Afghan
nation), it is one of the most segmented and fragmented countries on
the earth.35 For example, more than 40 first languages are spoken in
Afghanistan, 17 in Nuristan Province alone—more languages than
are spoken in all of Western Europe. These languages are largely
determinant of identity, as civil conflict has raged in Afghanistan since
the 1970s between the Pashto-speaking plurality of the population and
shifting coalitions of the other ethnic and linguistic groups.36 Adding
to the fragmentation is the hostility between the Sunni Muslim majority
and the Shia minority, which is predominantly but not exclusively of the
Hazāra ethnic group.
The status of the two binary factors necessary for government
success—the existence of a sustainable and reasonably competent army
in 2002, when the Taliban were driven from power and began to build
a rebel movement, and the existence of cross-border sanctuary to a
militarily significant degree—is well known.
The mathematical odds against success were rendered
insurmountable by the imposition of popular democracy—a form of
government which had never been practiced in Afghanistan—that is
not widely accepted as legitimate governance in the Weberian sense.
Less than 30 percent of the voting-eligible Afghan population voted
35. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and Metin Gurcan, What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding CounterInsurgency Efforts in Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2016).
36. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding
the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 41–77; and Bernard
Comrie, ed., The Major Languages of Western Europe, 1st ed. (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2015), v–vi.
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for Hamid Karzai, and less than 5 percent voted for Ashraf Ghani in
2019. The return of the Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah from exile
in 2001 as a ceremonial monarch and a figure of national unity, similar
to the role played by the royal families in Great Britain and Japan, could
have conferred popular legitimacy on a parliamentary government. The
return of King Zahir Shah, however, was rejected by the George W.
Bush administration, and the Afghan monarchy was eliminated against
the wishes of three quarters of the official delegates to the Emergency
Loya Jirga in what amounted to a CIA coup d’état.37
Traditional legitimacy in the form of a Pashtun king has always been
the predominant source of legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan.38
The absence of the legitimacy and stability provided by this monarchy
in Afghan society created a vacuum, and the Pashtun Taliban movement
essentially filled this legitimacy vacuum with a religious source of
legitimacy understood by the population. Although the Taliban initially
enjoyed little support among the Afghan people as a result of its failures
in governance, draconian social policies from 1996 to 2001, and harsh
Deobandi interpretations of Islamic law not native to Afghanistan, their
support has increased. Today the Ghani government maintains full
control of less than 54 percent of the Afghan population.39
Table 3. Conflict parameters: Afghanistan
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

No

External Sanctuary

Yes

Iraq
Many of the same problems were faced in the nation-building effort
in Iraq after 2003. As defined by most political scientists, Iraq was—and
is—not a nation.40 Following World War I, in the wake of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, the boundary lines drawn across the sand by Gertrude Bell
37. Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned, 143; Pamela Hess “Afghan Council Postponed, King
Steps Aside,” United Press International, June 10, 2002, www.upi.com/Business_News/Security
-Industry/2002/06/10/Afghan-council-postponed-king-steps-aside/UPI-62001023745673/; and
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard, “Accusations of American Meddling Mar Afghan Council,” Eurasianet,
June 12, 2002, https://eurasianet.org/accusations-of-american-meddling-mar-afghan-council; and
author interviews with two eyewitness participants.
38. Roy, Islam and Resistance; and Carlo J. V. Caro, “Afghan Kings and the Failure of U.S.
Military Intervention,” RealClearDefense, February 12, 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com
/articles/2020/02/12/afghan_kings_and_the_failure_of_us_military_intervention_115034.html.
39. Bill Roggio, “Analysis: US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains
Ground in Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org
/archives/2019/01/analysis-us-military-downplays-district-control-as-taliban-gains-ground-in
-afghanistan.php.
40. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
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in 1922 to create Iraq’s current boundaries made no political sense.41 By
the beginning of the twenty-first century, only Saddam Hussein’s brutal
police state held the country together. Following the US invasion, the
government installed by the United States was not seen as legitimate by
85 percent of the Iraqi population, and it was never able to provide full
security to at least 85 percent of the total population. Thus, none of the
three 85 percent parameters of government success against insurgency
existed after 2003. Because the standing Iraqi army was disbanded
before the start of the internal rebellion and some rebels were able to find
sanctuary and support to some degree across international borders, none
of the five political-military factors established by the research study
as necessary for government success in quelling an internal rebellion
existed in Iraq in 2003.
Table 4. Conflict parameters: Iraq
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

No

External Sanctuary

Yes

Colombia

The Marxist insurgency in Colombia, known at first as “La Violencia,”
began in the 1920s and was waged by a number of rebel groups, most
notably since 1960 the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación
Nacional ) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). This internal conflict, suppressed
in 2016, makes a fascinating case study within the context of the five
parameters of the research project. Colombia can be defined as a nation,
as at least 85 percent of the population self-identifies as Colombian.
Colombia is multiethnic, but its people share a language, religion, and
culture that are almost universal throughout the country.
Colombia’s governments in the twentieth century were seldom
broadly popular but were accepted as legitimate in the sense that
the government’s laws were recognized and its right to govern was
accepted by at least 85 percent of the population.42 Colombia’s rebels
could not gain cross-border sanctuary in militarily significant numbers;
Colombia’s border regions with Venezuela and Ecuador are remote and
uninhabitable jungles, a deadly “green desert” in which daily survival
41. James Buchan, “Miss Bell’s Lines in the Sand,” Guardian, March 11, 2003, https://www
.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/12/iraq.jamesbuchan; and Robin Wright, “How the Curse of
Sykes-Picot Still Haunts the Middle East,” New Yorker, April 30, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com
/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east.
42. See for example Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia 1875–
2002 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Abbey Steele, Democracy and Displacement in
Colombia’s Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017); and Summer Newton, ed., Assessing
Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies: Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia
(1964–2009) (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, undated), https://www
.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Colombia-BOOK.pdf.
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even for experts is a struggle. At the outbreak of La Violencia, Colombia’s
standing army was sustained by the government, and the army was
reasonably competent as defined by the study.
But one of the five factors—population security—was initially
missing from the equation, allowing a succession of rebel movements
to survive at a level that stressed Colombian society at times. Beginning
in the 1920s, government forces could not isolate the guerillas from at
least 85 percent of Colombia’s population because at least 70 percent of
the country’s population at the onset of La Violencia was rural. During
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, Colombia
underwent a dramatic demographic shift—by 2018, just under 80
percent of the population was urban. Because cities are much easier to
secure, Colombian security forces were eventually able to reach the magic
number of more than 85 percent population security and control.43 The
steady construction of all-season roads linking Colombia’s rural regions
to its cities also made the movement of security forces easier and faster,
as did the advent of helicopters for military transport.
In short, all five political-military conditions existed by 2016 to
starve the last of the guerilla forces, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia movement, of sufficient recruits and sources of popular
support, and the survivors agreed to a cease-fire.
Table 5. Conflict parameters: Colombia
Factor

Metric

National Identity

Yes

Government Legitimacy

Yes

Population Security

No → Yes

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

No

Malaya
The Malayan Emergency is another notable case study that confirms
the parameters identified in the research project. This 1950s conflict,
in what was then the British colony of Malaya, is often cited as proof
that counterinsurgency works if “done right.” In fact, it does not. In
the context of the identified political-military parameters of government
success, all five elements necessary to defeat an internal rebellion were in
place at the start of the conflict.
First, Malaya was a nation as defined by political science: at least
85 percent of the population identified itself as Malay—of the Malay
ethnic group—which comprised and still comprises approximately
90 percent of the country’s population.44 The Malay speak a common
language understood throughout the country and share a common
culture. Significantly, during the 1950s conflict and subsequent outbreaks
43. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Población ajustada por
cobertura - Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2018 (Bogotá, Colombia: DANE, 2018).
44. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
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of violence in Malaya since then, virtually all the rebels were ethnic
Chinese, who comprise just 10 percent of the country’s population. Not
all ethnically Chinese citizens were rebels, but essentially all rebels were
ethnically Chinese.
Furthermore, the Chinese minority, who faced economic
discrimination and a permanent underclass status within the country,
lived in an apartheid society in which they were clustered almost entirely
in segregated villages and towns and did not usually venture into Malay
settlements. Because the physiognomy of the two ethnic groups is quite
distinct, this separation was relatively easy to enforce. As a result, the
government secured more than 85 percent of the population—the
90 percent of the population which was Malay—and excluded anyone
who might have been a guerilla from Malay areas. The ethnic Chinese
rebels were easily spotted and detained in most of the country, and
they could find little or no support or sympathy among the majority
Malay population.
The British faced no problems with a host-country government,
unlike the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For example,
they could make any rules or laws they pleased, and they did not have
to beg an intransigent president to make needed reforms. In addition,
the British publicized they would return the country to the ethnic Malay
majority as soon as the rebellion was quelled. This move incentivized
the Malay people to work even harder to suppress a minority group they
already disliked intensely and enabled the government to claim sufficient
legitimacy to conduct the counter-rebellion with the support of at least
85 percent of the people.
The ethnic Chinese rebels were unable to gain meaningful external
support or cross-border sanctuary, and British Malaya had welldisciplined and competent military and police forces sustained by the
British government in London. Thus all five essential political-military
factors permitting government success were in place at the start of the
conflict and remained there until the conflict ended, which took many
years to accomplish, even with every advantage favoring the British.
Table 6: Conflict parameters: Malaya
Factor

Metric

National Identity

Yes

Government Legitimacy

Yes

Population Security

Yes

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

No

The eventual victory in Malaya had nothing to do with military
skills or tactics peculiar to counterinsurgency or with specialized
cultural knowledge the British possessed beyond the ability to discern
the difference between the Malay and Chinese citizens of the colony.
Instead, this victory had everything to do with national identity,
population protection, legitimacy of governance, and the lack of
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cross-border sanctuary for rebel soldiers in any significant numbers, all
of which existed before the conflict started.

Conclusion

The most critical lessons drawn from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
other internal conflicts are: 1) in no case since 1945 has either a sense of
national identity or the legitimacy of the central government increased
during the conflict period, and 2) the levels of national identity, legitimacy
of governance, and population security necessary to suppress an internal
rebellion are all 85 percent or more. In the 53 conflicts meeting the
study criteria for intensity and rebel goals and in which any of these
parameters were not met, government mortality was close to 100
percent. Moreover, no instances were found in the 53 conflicts where
counterinsurgency efforts to increase the legitimacy of or support for an
existing government had such an effect. Because no increase in national
identity or legitimacy of governance was found during the course of
the conflict in any of the 53 case studies, their levels at the onset of conflict
are determinant of outcomes. In other words, these factors predict the
probability of government failure with a remarkable degree of accuracy.
In October 2001, when asked by a reporter if the United States could
avoid Afghanistan becoming another quagmire like Vietnam, then
President George W. Bush replied, “We learned some very important
lessons in Vietnam.”45 Over the intervening 20 years, the political
goals of the campaign, the military conduct of the conflict, and the
implementation of the nation-building efforts of the war in Afghanistan
have shown the United States did not learn the most important lessons.
With the US Army now pivoting again from small wars to planning for
near-peer conflict as it did after Vietnam, the true lessons of the wars in
Vietnam and Afghanistan, and about counterinsurgency in general, are
in danger of being lost once more.46

45. Nayanima Basu, “When Bush, Top US Officials Compared Afghan War to Vietnam
War—a War America Lost,” Print, December 11, 2019, https://theprint.in/world/when-bush
-top-us-officials-compared-afghan-war-to-vietnam-war-a-war-america-lost/333657/.
46. Michael T. Klare, “The US Military Is Preparing for a New War: After Years of a Fruitless War
on Terror, the Pentagon Is Turning Its Focus to China and Russia,” Nation, June 5, 2019, https://www
.thenation.com/article/us-military-is-preparing-for-new-wars-china-russia/.

